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ABSTRACT: The article studies two especific forms o f social interaction, l i n g u i s t i c a l l y 
mediated: promises and threats. Two pregnant theoretical accounts are to be considered 
here. Firstly, the analysis propounded wi th in the framework o f Game Theory, assuming 
an intentionalist account o f human agency and an instrumentalist concept of rat ionali ty; 
and secondly, the attempt carried out by Speech Acts theorists. In the first case, i t can be 
shown that the theoretical premisses are insufficient to offer a proper account o f such basic 
forms of social interchange. This result gives indirect support, so it is argued, to the sec-
ond theoretical framework considered. Yet some of the solutions offered seem to be also 
unsatisfactory. Reasons are given of why it is so, and an attempt of solution, wi th in the 
same theoretical framework, is suggested. 
Keywords: Speech acts theory, Game theory, indirect speech acts, communicative rat ionali ty, 
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/ 
In a pair of illuminating articles, J. Heath has studied the shortcomings and 
difficulties of game theory for a satisfactory account of linguistically medi-
ated interaction and, in particular, of communicative rationality. Taking a 
point of departure in the works by other specialists, he convincingly shows that 
"standard non-cooperative game theory is unable, in principle, to model 
speech acts, and is therefore unable to specify what is rational about linguisti-
cally mediated interactions"1. In searching for a theory of social action, he 
considers game theory to be bound to model instrumental rationality, and 
defends a necessity to account for a non-instrumental, norm-governed form o f 
rational action, which would be analizable as a generalization of J. Habermas' 
notion of communicative rationality. Nevertheless, in what seems to be a fur-
ther development of this programmatic suggestion, he has tried to show that 
certain forms of linguistically mediated interaction, usually considered to be 
strategic manifestations of instrumental rationality (namely, threats), can be 
reconstructed in terms of this non-instrumental, norm-governed rationality. 
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A i m of the present paper is to study the validity of the two thesis given 
support to in Heath (1995). Here the author shows, firstly, that threats, ana-
lysed as a linguistically mediated, coordinative interaction, cannot be ade-
quately accounted for from within standard game theory and therefore are not 
instrumentally rational actions -in the precise technical sense of the theory. 
Secondly, he claims threats to be pragmatically dependent on norm-governed 
actions and thus susceptible of integration within the frame of the formal-
pragmatic meaning theory developed by J. Habermas in the first formulation 
of his seminal theory of communicative action (hereafter TkH)2. Although 
Heath's first thesis is a well-established result within the modified theoretic 
model he proposes, I see the second more problematic and difficult to sustain. 
The following reflection is an attempt to show why it is so. 
/ / 
A core intuition in Heath's reconstruction and propounded model is that, for a 
threat to be successful, the threatening action must be something the agent 
would rather prefer not to perform, namely a "mutually damaging action for 
both participants in the interaction". For, as he argues, only then could the 
hearer (here, the receiver of the threat) consider the threat rational and thus 
credible; that is, only then could the hearer consider reliable the agent's 
"promise", that he wi l l not carry out his threat -hence maximizing, thogether 
with the hearer's, his own utility. For in such a case he receives, as a counterpart, 
another utility he prefers. But as a result, "in order to threaten credibly, players 
'have to be willing to engage in non-utility maximizing actions" (Heath 1995, 
p. 232). This means that the agent's performing the threat would contradict the 
supposition that he is rational, given the instrumental concept embodied by 
standard game theory. 
This very diff iculty, in the general case of any cooperative interaction or 
interaction requiring coordination, has been made manifest by the proponents 
of rational choice theory themselves. Following J. Elster here, this theory as-
sumes a principle of methodological individualism; and, in order to explain 
and justify behaviour in a choice situation, three elements are taken into ac-
count: the feasible set of all courses of actions (occassionally, with constraints); 
the causal structure of the situation, which determines which course of action 
leads to what outcomes; and a subjective ranking ("preferences") of the feasible 
alternatives, these numbers being called the utilities of the corresponding out-
comes or consequences. Acting rationally means choosing the ihighest-ranked 
element on the feasible set; furthermore, the normatively proper decision cr i -
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terion is to choose that element which maximizes expected utility. The ex-
pected utility of an action is defined as the weighted average of the utilities 
that the action wil l yield under different states of the world, the weights being 
the probabilities of the states3. 
In his paper, Heath recalls a further main distinction applying to rational-
choice situations, mamely that between parametric and strategic decisions. 
Whereas in a parametric decision the agent faces constraints that are in some 
sense external or parametric, strategic situations are characterized by interde-
pendence of decisions. The latter are specifically studied by game theory, 
which considers rational choice in situations where the outcome depends on the 
choices of more than one agent and the agents are aware of one another's ration-
ality. The choice takes place between two or more strategies. Moreover, 
games in which agents do not communicate with one another, except through 
their actions in the game itself, are termed non-cooperative. In strategic situa-
tions in general, an equilibrium point is a set of choices, one for each person 
involved in the interaction, that are optimal against each other. A Nash equilib-
rium is reached whenever each player's strategy maximizes his expected u t i l -
ity, given the other player's strategy. This requires mutual consistency and hence 
that each player holds true beliefs about what the other wi l l do. Moreover, 
each player's choice of strategy is constrained by knowledge that the other is 
rational and so similarly constrained -according to the concept of rationality 
as individual util i ty maximization embodied by the theory4. As a result, 
premisses of game theory make it diff icult to account for coordination or to 
explain elementary facts of social life, like commitments and, paradigmati-
cally, promises. The assumption that communication exists leads the way 
either to an infinite regress of anticipations that undermine determining a 
maximizing strategy, or to the necessary postulate of a mutual knowledge o f 
rationality or perfect knowledge, which is to the effect that communication 
becomes "cheap talk" and is in fact restricted to what is manifested through the 
performed actions themselves. This is to the effect that accounting for com-
mitments evidences "unmistakeably a deficiency in the model", given that 
"covenants of mutual trust are not possible for rational players"^. 
This conclusion, seemingly paradoxical, comes from the very concept o f 
rationality into play. As Hollis/Sudgen show, the utility-maximizing strat-
egy for the agent in the 'Promising Game', archetypically in the 'Prisonner's 
Dilemma Game', would be to say the words, thus inducing the hearer to per-
form, but then not to perform in return. But i f agents generally acted in this 
way, the speaking of the words would not be a reliable indicator of future per-
formance. For this reason "there is a deep-seated belief among game theorists 
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that words like ' I promise' are cheap talk and convey nothing" (Hollis/Sudgen 
1993, pp. 15, 17-18, 25). As R.B. Myerson observes, this is due to the fact that 
non-cooperative game theory does not permit us to suppose that communica-
tion can determine the effective equilibrium actually played, because the 
meanings of all statements are supposed to be determined by the effective 
equilibrium itself; non-cooperative games with signalling and communication 
derive the meanings of all statements and signals f rom the equilibrium in 
which they are used6. In such contexts it has been proven that, whenever a preex-
isting common language is taken into account whose meanings are not en-
dogenously determined by the equilibrium in which they are used, the degree 
to which the players' interests coincide limits the equilibrium effectiveness o f 
cheap talk?. Heath notices that, according to this view, a speech act turns out to 
be nothing more than a "move" in the game and any action transmits informa-
tion by virtue of what the other player is able to infer about the speaker's inten-
tions, on the basis of the move made. Hence communication cannot determine 
the equilibrium reached, because the meaning of all statements is determined 
endogenously by the equilibrium itself 8. 
To account for common phenomena of social life, specialists assume a ne-
cessity to extend the model, mainly with the purpose of integrating motiva-
tion -psychological, social (conventions and norms), or other- as a determining 
factor on the decision. Different procedures have been advanced to sever tKe 
conceptual gap between util i ty and choice, e.g. a concept of constrained 
maximization, in order to credit rational agents with the powers of strategic 
reflection. Nevertheless, in such cases parametric environments have to be 
abandoned, since i t is no longer possible to justify the idea that players l ink 
subjective probabilities to the others' decisions. Within certain games there is 
a necessity to communicate the strategic reflection outcome to the others, what 
drives back to the problems of credibility and cheap talk mentioned. For 
these cases, cooperative models are proposed, in which strategies are defined as 
a set specifying, for each move in the game, an action and a message; thus a 
strategy profile would include both actions and messages. Here again, how-
ever, "introducing knowledge of language as a new source of beliefs" raises new 
problems, particularly because the cooperative framework fails to provide the 
standard solution equilibria for non-coooperative games and the models, once 
constructed, do not guarantee the existence of a solution (cf. Heath 1996, pp. 
21-25). 
Alternatively, so-called "evolutionary perspectives" have been aplied to 
game theory, in an approach which views equilibria not as the consequences o f 
ideal rationality, but as historically contingent conventions. This explanation 
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is considered to suggest that a Wittgensteinian perspective would be possible, 
when accounting for the function of social norms and normative expectations-, to 
the extent that meaning assigned to behaviour is considered to be a matter o f 
rule following in an institutional or social context, interaction would be analiti-
cally prior to action. Hence games as the 'Promising Game' would not be "con-
text-neutral", and normative traits should be constitutive of the players' own 
conception of their strategies (cf. Hollis/Sudgen 1993, p. 31). 
/ / / 
This very necessity of taking into account a normative background is present in 
Heath's analysis. He proposes a model for threats and promises following the 
Prisonner's Dilema extensive form, but modifies it to face the challenge "to 
f ind a different game to model the situations in which promises are made" 
(Hollis/Sudgen 1993, p. 17). According to the author, this should result in "an 
account of threats as norm-governed actions" (Heath 1995, p. 225). On this 
reconstruction, threats differentiate themselves from promises because, in the 
former case, performing the commitment would be "mutually damaging" to 
both the threatened person and the agent, whereas in the latter the action 
"would only hurt" the agent (Heath 1995, p. 233). Furthermore, Heath assumes 
R. Selten's notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium, according to which not only 
should a reasonable equilibrium strategy profile be Nash in the large game, 
but the relevant subset of it should be also Nash in any proper subgame, even i f 
this subgame is never reached in the course of the game. 
Heath's extensive form game for threats would be the following^: 
1 2 
D R 
o o (0,0) 
I I 
I U I L 
I I 
(2,2) (3,1) 
I t is possible to reconstruct what the author represents here. To account for 
covenants of mutual trust -archetypically, in the 'Promising Game'-, a situation 
is figured where one party performs some service for the other, in return for a 
promise that the other wil l perform some service later -in Heath's represented 
situation, not to perform the threat 1 0. Here, player 1 is the threatened person 
and player 2 is the agent; U is a situation where 1 performs what 2 requires 
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(e.g. a threatened bank clerk hands the money over to a bank robber); in D , on 
the contrary, 1 does not perform; then it is 2 who has to "move", performing 
(situation R) or not performing (situation L) the threat (e.g. shooting). The 
utilities for both players at each possible move are represented by the ordered 
pairs, where the first number is the uti l i ty for 1 and the second the uti l i ty for 
2. According to Heath's reconstruction, the utility of not performing the threat 
is for the agent higher than that of performing it. 
To this analysis i t can be objected that in real situations, however, there is 
no perfect knowledge of the other's preferences, so that 1, the threatened per-
son, cannot be certain as to which util i ty does 2, the agent, assign to L. I t 
seems possible to figure a different model, alternative to Heath's, where the 
implausible assumption that performing the threat is always damaging for the 
agent be suspended -and thus where the theoretical postulate of perfect knowl-
edge of rationality do not include this assumption 1 1. 
In fact, Heaht's final proposal is intended to be of wide import. For, f r o m 
the double observation that "[t]here are some clear instances in which threats 
are directly norm-governed actions" -instances that, as it w i l l be argued here, 
should perhaps be considered warnings- and that "the imperative contains an 
obvious reference to the normative background that licenses the action", to-
gether with the structural similarity in game theory between promises and 
threats, this author draws the conclusion that " [i]legitimate threats are therefore 
parasitic upon legitimate threats, in exactly the same way that insincere prom-
ises are parasitic upon sincere ones". Therefore he considers justified to con-
clude that the basic position in his reconstruction is "recognizably Habermas'" 
(Heath 1995, pp. 234, 239) [m.e., C.C.]. 
Nevertheless, the tacit nivelation here effected of two different va l id i ty 
criteria, that of sincerity (referred to the expresive domain) and that of le-
gi t imity (belonging to the social domain of values and norms), seems to point 
out to some lack of concordance between Heath's proposal and the TkH 
framework. Hence a more detailed analysis is called for. From the study to 
be carried out it wi l l result that, f rom a formal pragmatics perspective, a very 
important triple distinction is urged: that among, firstly, legitimate warnings 
(what Heath terms "legitimate threats, secondly paradigmatic regulative 
speech acts as promises or commitments, and finally coercive interchanges (on 
the present account, threats in a strict sense). 
VI 
Heath's remark that there is an insufficient distinction between parametric and 
strategic rationality within TkH is undoubtedly accurate, i f these notions are 
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taken in strictly game-theoretical terms. The author aims at giving support to 
what seems to be Habermas' own assumption, namely, that instrumental ra-
tionality in the sense of the TkH -as opposed to communicative- effectively 
corresponds to the notion introduced by game theory. Yet what seems to f o l -
low from Heath's analysis is that they are two different notions, in part deter-
mined by the general theoretical frameworks to which they belong. On the one 
hand, as Heath recalls, "standard game theory models specifically exclude 
communication among partners" (Heath 1995, p. 235). On the other hand, TkH 
explicitly finds a point of departure in G.H. Mead's notion of simbolically 
(linguistically) mediated interaction; its reconstruction of the rational basis o f 
speech underlying processes of human understanding is therefore grounded on 
this form of analytically prior social interaction. 
According to the formal pragmatics embedded by TkH, what characterizes 
the nature of an illocutive act is the aspect under which the speaker claims va-
lidi ty, hence that susceptible of a critical positioning from the part of the 
hearer. In the case of what, following Heath's account, would represent a threat 
not conforming to norms (or a threat simpliciter on the present account), is this 
very possibility what results nullified in the interaction. This fact allows as-
signing to threats a different conceptual status from that conferred on those 
cases, like promises or warnings of santion, where conformity to norms makes 
the illocution susceptible of criticism. This requisite of dialogical fallibility^2, 
which is what distinguishes communicative from non-communicative (strate-
gic-instrumental) speech acts, is absent from Heath's considerations. 
Habermas' original thesis asserted the conceptual preeminence of norm-
conformed illocutions over any other uses of language, these latter being then 
termed non-communicative. This statement turned out to be problematic in 
the particular case of manifestly strategic speech acts -such as negociations, 
threats and offerings of advantage, and even bare imperatives-, to the extent 
that some critical studies have suggested restricting formal pragmatics analy-
sis to the communicative uses of language^. Inversely, in the case of hiddendly 
strategic speech acts -paradigmatically, insincere promises-, their dependence 
on sincere, norm-conformed ones is considered well-founded and indisput-
able. Here the validity claim of sincerity, referred to the expressive dimen-
sion of speech, has in any case to be distinguished from the validity claim o f 
correctness or legitimacy, this relative to the normative dimension where in-
terpersonal relationships are established. Finally, a thrid validity claim o f 
truth would be linked to the propositional component of the speech act, and 
would become susceptible of criticism in the paradigmatic case of an epis-
temic use of language -resting as a tacit presupposition in other cases. There-
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fore it is a generalized notion of validity, in the sense of rational acceptability, 
that which comes to constitute the core of this pragmatist meaning theory. The 
strong underlying thesis: "man versteht einen illokutionären Akt , wenn man 
weiß, was ihn akzeptabel macht", asserts that an orientation to the possible 
validity of utterances belongs to the pragmatic conditions not only of human 
agreement, but also -and with priority- to those of language understanding in 
general. 
In its most recent revision, however, the theory has made it explicit that not 
every language use is communicative, and that not every linguistic communica-
tion is oriented to an agreement based on validity claims intersubjectively 
recognised. Thus in an epistemic language use applied to the expression o f 
objective world knowledge, and in a teleological use applied to calculations 
of success in human action, the orientation towards strictly illocutionary ends 
is not essential. In the former case, it suffices that the speaker knows the state-
ment truth conditions and that the statement expresses his own belief on its 
truth when he utters it . In the latter, it suffices that the speaker knows the suc-
cess conditions of his utterance, whenever this utterance is an intentional state-
ment employed monologically and directed towards a plan of action; here, 
the success conditions are identical with the conditions under which the state-
ment would become true. None of the two language uses needs an orientation 
towards an intersubjective recognisance, of the statement truth in the former 
case or of the intention seriousness in the latter, and are then termed non-
communicative {di. Habermas 1996, pp. 73-76). For, according to the revised 
theory, these language uses are possible through an abstraction proccess which 
suspends the "always given" reference of epistemic statements to truth and in-
tentional statements to seriousness. Therefore no claim to rightness underlies 
the speaker's speech act. Since any demand to intersubjective recognisance is 
abstracted away, the speech act justificatory grounds become relative to the 
viewpoint of the speaker {aktorrelative Gründe) and are rational only relatively 
to h im (cf. Habermas 1996, p. 77). This trait seems to be, in the revised ver-
sion of the theory, what definitely distinguishes the non-communicative uses o f 
language from the communicative one. 
Thus any expression of wi l l addressed by the speaker to the hearer reduces 
to a non-communicative language use whenever the virtual justificatory grounds 
giving support to the exigence are barely relative to the speaker. This happens, 
e.g., when the speaker resorts to sanctions or rewards, thus attributing these to 
the hearer as grounds-for-him, in order to have his exigence successfully per-
formed. And it is easy to see that this would be the case of any coercive threat. 
154 THEORIA - Segunda Epoca 
Vol 16/1 2001 147-166 
Cristina C O R R E D O R THREATS AND C O M M U N I C A T I V E RATIONALITY 
I t is essential to this formal-pragmatic analysis to take account of the dou-
ble structure of speech, which articulates an illocutionary component conveying 
the mode of communication and a propositional component conveying what is 
communicated. The validity claims offered with any speech act are internally 
connected with the illocutionary component. Correctness is thus referred to the 
performance of the act and its accord with a set of constitutive rules and norma-
tive presuppositions, susceptible of reflexive reconstruction. In the case of a 
promise, the intrinsic validity claim could result violated, e.g., whenever the 
agent is unable to accomplish the commitment, even i f the promise was sin-
cere. But this regulative speech act is also susceptible of criticism, depending 
on whether the promised action is morally, or legally, legitimate. This latter 
criticism could be considered, in principle, an external one, to the extent that 
it evaluates the (propositional) content of the regulative speech act, to be dis-
tinguished from the intrinsic correctness dimension relative to the performance 
of the act itself. Nevertheless, in consonance to the formal-pragmatic recon-
struction, this legitimacy or moral rightness of the promised action -of what is 
stated in the propositional component- should be seen as a normative presup-
position constitutive toi the illocution, and internally connected to the va l id i ty 
claim intrinsic to the act. For only then would the promise be susceptible o f 
criticism in the reflexive domain of discourse, in reason of the legitimacy o f 
the promised action. And, in such a case, this condition should be included 
into the set of essential conditions in the formal-pragmatic sense. Yet the ques-
tion arises whether or not all regulative speech acts, as commitments in gen-
eral, advises, warnings, requirements, offerings, etc., are constituted by this 
normative presupposition concerning the legitimacy of the action stated in the 
propositional component. 
This distinction, when applied to Heath's examples of "threats" -a police-
man orders to stop under threat of shooting, a mother demands a correct be-
haviour under threat of punishment-, allows for a difference between the nor-
mative background which constitutes these speech acts, on the one hand, and the 
potential of reasons allowing for a justification of the demands themselves, on 
the other. In the policeman's case, the agent is not engaging in a personal com-
mitment, or putting himself under a moral obligation with respect to the 
hearer, but making the hearer take notice of his professional assignment in the 
circumstances. I t is against a specific institutional background that the po-
liceman's speech act can thus take the illocutionary force it has -that of a warn-
ing, more than that of a coercive imperative or "threat" in the strict sense. Only 
so understood could the legitimacy of the embedded demand be justified or 
questioned. In the case of the second example, it is a social and cultural back-
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ground of recognised roles and educative values and norms which turns the 
mother's warning in something different from a mere personal commitment 
and would eventually allow for a justification. In both cases, Austin's 
criterium to differentiate illocutions from perlocutions could be of help: the 
illocutionary mode of the speech act could be made explicit through the locu-
tion " I advise/warn you...", but more diff icul t ly so with something like " I 
threat you of...", or " I coerce you by.. ." 1 4 . 
In TkH, Habermas accounted for the binding force of illocutions through 
the notion of acceptability conditions, which he termed also illocutionary success 
conditions. He subdivided it and spoke of applying the notion in a broader and 
a narrower sense (cf. Habermas 1986, pp. 359, 362-363). Acceptability condi-
tions in the narrower sense would correspond, so do I think, to the conditions 
of illocutionary success in Searle/Vanderveken's last speech act theory1^. They 
refer to the hearer's understanding of the speaker's utterance, and include the 
propositional and the pragmatical force component, the latter in terms o f 
"speech act X counts asY for the interlocutors". Acceptability conditions in the 
broader sense refer to the position taken by the hearer, i.e. to his accepting the 
offering embedded in the speech act and his recognizing its validity. They 
would correspond to conditions of non-defective performance as introduced 
by Searle/Vanderveken's theory. For both notions include the set of rules con-
stitutive for the type of speech act considered; namely, preparatory, proposi-
tional content, and sincerity conditions. But, finally, speech act theory in 
Searle/Vanderveken's proposal includes a set of satisfaction conditions (of f i t 
between words and world); and to these conditions does it belong the subse-
quent action in correspondence to the speech act -the accomplishment of an 
order, the fulfi lment of a promise, etc. According to the formal pragmatics 
reconstruction, in contrast, any subsequent action different f rom the hearer's 
acceptance is seen as part of the illocution perlocutionary effect. Therefore the 
"hearer's acceptance" has to be understood as a critical "Yes" to the speaker's 
offering, grounded on the hearer's recognizing or accepting it as v a l i d 1 6 . This 
positioning is not a mere change of "belief -as it could be considered f rom a 
Gricean perspective, or from a D. Lewis' one, to which Heath seems to sub-
scribe-, but i t is rather to be seen as inseparable f rom the possibly explici t 
(linguistic) answer and its relevance for the subsequent interaction -even i f this 
consists just of a prosecution of the understanting proccess, linguistically car-
ried out. 
Hence, in the original formal pragmatics theory, anything beyond the f u l -
filment of the acceptability conditions -i.e. of the satisfaction conditions in the 
TkH sense, or pragmatical understanding, together with the validation condi-
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tions, or the hearer's recognizing and accepting the validity of the embedded 
claims- was conceptualized as perlocutionary. This provided us with a 
criterium to delimit strategic f rom communicative linguistic interaction. 
For, as emphasized above, instrumental rationality turns words into "cheap 
talk", and meaning emerges from actions effectively performed and their out-
comes, thereof communication adds nothing within this game-theoretical 
framework. Still the last revision of the theory defends the dependence of any 
perlocutionary success on the manifest success of an illocutionary act. Although 
this dominance of illocutionary ends seems to disappear in the case of a par-
ticular language use, namely perlocutions, these do need the vehicle of i l locu-
tionary acts. And, according to the theory, any strategic language use works 
following the model of perlocutions; furthermore, threats belong in particular 
to this type (cf. Habermas 1996, pp. 82-84). From these theoretic statements, 
it seems legitime to conclude that the epistemic and expressive non-communi-
cative uses of language have turned out to be a sort of "intermediate" categories 
between the communicative one, which claims rightness through a demand o f 
intersubjective recognisance, and perlocutions. I t is relativity to the speaker's 
viewpoint what distinguishes in general non-communicative from communica-
tive interaction linguistically mediated; and perlocutions are to be differenti-
ated from other non-communicative uses by their exclusive perlocutionary 
aim, versus the virtual illocutionary object of epistemic or expressive language 
uses1?. 
What happens in the case of a threat, that is to say, of a coercive interaction? 
Heath proposes to see threats as a kind of commitment, close to a promise: " I 
promise you that, i f you do x [hand the money over], I won't do y [shoot]". 
Adapting Searle's original analysis in his first theory of speech acts 1 8, constitu-
tive rules for commitments -here, "not to do y- would include the following: 
that it not be obvious, both for hearer and speaker, that the latter wi l l not (or 
would prefer not to) do y in the circumstances, and that the hearer does prefer 
the speaker's not performing y. Contrary to this, on Heath's account the particu-
lar commitment embedded in a threat equals that of a promise because the 
speaker would, in any circumstance, prefer not doing y and thus would not do y 
-this is what makes him "instrumentally irrational", whenever the threat is sin-
cere and therefore the speaker sincerely intends to do y. From this theoretic 
viewpoint, an "irrational threat" would not satisfy one of the constitutive con-
ditions for the type of speech acts to which i t is supposed to belong. But what 
kind of reasons would allow the hearer critically take a position and answer 
with "No" to the speaker's "offering", in such a way that this answer be re-
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spected and accepted by the speaker as an attitude entailed by his i l locution-
ary obligation or commitment? 
O n Heath's analysis, an "illegitimate threat" is said to be similar to an in-
sincere promise because, for the speech act to obtain perlocutionary success, the 
hearer has to be deceived by it: either he thinks the speech act to be a norma-
tively correct illocution, or he thinks the speaker sincere though instrumentally 
irrational, when this one decides to stick to the commitment. Nevertheless, in 
contrast wi th this analysis and according to the sketched TkH framework, the 
formal-pragmatic reconstruction of communicative action differentiated, 
among illocutionary success conditions (i.e. acceptability conditions in the 
broader sense), the sincerity conditions f rom the essential ones. In the case o f 
paradigmatic regulative speech acts, as argued above, the speaker's demand o f 
recognition is relative to the correctness and legitimacy of his promise or 
commitment; but this takes place under the assumption that the sincerity rule 
is kept. This demand of recognition does rest on a potential of reasons that 
would allow the hearer to question it. In coercive imperatives, however, the 
rational basis of speech is displaced and substituted by a request of interchange 
to which no rational objection can be opposed. In conformity to the original 
formal pragmatics theory, an illegitimate commitment of any sort -the status 
claimed for "illegitimate threats"- should be compared to an i l legi t imate 
promise, which is not the same as an insincere one, the latter undoubtedly para-
sitic upon sincere. 
This observation seems to be supported by the theory in its last revision. 
According to i t (cf. Habermas 1996, pp. 83-84), the illocutionary act which 
consists of a specific warning of sanction becomes a threat when the speaker 
explicitly refers to the perlocutionary effect of intimidation or fear which he 
on purpose seeks to inflict on the hearer. Therefore, not only can the speech act 
be critically questioned [a] because of its lack of seriousness as an intentional 
claim, or [b] because of its falsity as a statement whose realisation is not ob-
jectively possible, but also [c] due to the speaker's incapacity to bring about 
the announced perlocutionary effect. In this last case [c], the speech act is ques-
tioned through its inefficacy. Only illocutionary acts are susceptible of being 
questioned in terms of their validity. 
But the last revision of the theory has introduced also a new conceptual dis-
tinction, which would apply in the particular case of perlocutions characterised 
as threats; the distinction depends on the type of contexts within which they 
appear. Namely, the subclass of perlocutions taking place in a normative con-
text. This would be the case of reproaches, legal inmputations, and moral re-
probations; and also that of official warnings of sanction (cf. Habermas 1996, 
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p. 84). The latter would correspond to Heath's legitimate threats. I t becomes 
necessary, in all these cases, to make appeal to a normative background, which 
in the latter case should have been brought about by a legitime political and 
juridical order, assumed to be based in an original consensus or social contract 
and seen in its turn legitimizing for the sanctioning norms invoqued. 
Nevertheless, it is important to notice here that "normative threats of sanc-
tion" are thematised by the theory as perlocutions that, only "secondary", can 
turn out to be embodied in a normative context. Contrary to this, and as 
stated before, in strategic contexts of action language exclusively works f o l -
lowing the model of perlocutions. Here communication is subordinated to 
end-oriented action, and interlocutors try to influence each other in benefit o f 
their own plans of action. Illocutionary ends become pertinent solely as condi-
tions of perlocutionary success. As a result, speech acts are devoid of their i l -
locutionary force; the presuppositions of communicative action are left sus-
pended, together with the agent's orientation towards validity claims aiming 
at intersubjective recognition -claims thus susceptible of discoursive resolu-
tion. Communication turns out to be indirect and parasitic with respect to a 
shared language knowledge. Each interlocutor has to suppose that the other 
decides rationally, and has to infer from individual convictions and his own 
preferences and designed ends (cf. Habermas 1996, p. 85). This allows us to 
conclude, contrary to Heath, that threats so considered in normative contexts 
do not result in a breakening of the internal link between Tightness of the pro-
positional content component and correctness of the illocutionary one. 
In its turn, a regulative speech act, paradigmatically a promise, is question-
able whenever some of its constitutive rules -in Searle's original sense- are vio-
lated. This happens, e.g., when the speaker is not in situation of realising his 
commitment, or the hearer does not desire what is offered to him. But another 
reason to question i t is that the promised action be morally reproachable, or 
that it be so the action demanded from the hearer. In such cases, it is not the 
formal or procedural correctness of the illocutionary act what fails, but the 
legitimacy of what the propositional content states and therefore the moral 
character of the tie or obligation that the illocution would constitute between 
the interlocutors. As defended above, there seems to be an internal link be-
tween the formal correctness of regulative speech acts -whereof the interlocu-
tors put themselves under an obligation or establish a moral tie between them-
and the legitimacy of their propositional contents. Finally, there is another 
case in which a promise or commitment is violated, as noticed by J. Bohmann: 
"A promise, say of equality, is not ideological when it is simply violated, as 
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much as when it is left standing and yet does not bind those with power in 
their subsequent interaction"!9. 
The previous observations give support to the significance of making ex-
plicit and keeping in mind the triple distinction indicated above. Firstly, 
"legitimate threats" in Heath's sense receive their legitimacy f rom that of an 
institutional and social background of laws and institutionalised values and 
norms, but not directly from the rational basis of speech and a moral, interper-
sonal tie established on it. This allows concluding that they are cases of legiti-
mate warnings. Secondly, in contrast to these legitimate warnings, whoever 
utters either a coercive imperative, or a threat in the strict sense oon the present 
account, means his speech act not as an illocutionary demand of recognition, to 
be based on the interlocutor's rational acceptance of the illocution -that is to 
say, based on the potential of reasons that make it correct and legitimate. He 
rather pretends that the coercion perlocutionary promts from the hearer the 
performance of an action. And thridly, in the case of regulative speech acts in 
the strict sense, the speaker's demand for the interlocutor's rational acceptance 
is constitutive of the illocution itself. 
In this last case, furthermore, the critical acceptance or positioning from the 
part of the hearer is not to be considered either, as noted above, an induced 
belief. Yet this seems to underly Heath's reconstruction, when he argues that, 
since " in principle beliefs cannot be outcomes, and instrumentally rational ac-
tion is by definition directed toward outcomes", one can conclude that then 
"actions aimed at producing beliefs cannot be modelled game-theoretically". 
From that he draws his final proposal: "An action that has another's belief'as its 
goal (...) is an understanding-oriented action" (Heath 1995, pp. 236, 238). 
Bohmann's quotation is here intended to make it evident that, in TkH, beliefs 
are taken into account because they are relevant for the subsequent interaction: 
they cannot be severed from actions, for it is this very fact what denounces 
their status of distorted communication. 
Carried to its l imi t , Heath's argument is intended to reach the conclusion 
that any linguistic, or linguistically mediatedInteraction whatsoever cannot possi-
bility be a manifestly strategic action, where the agent has an exclusively i n d i -
vidual goal and aims at an outcome. For any communication proccess would 
have the structure of a coordination problem and would presuppose a common 
set of standarized intracommunicative objectives. Nevertheless, a different 
possible conclusion is that this "weak" coordination, based on a set of stan-
darized structural elements, is to be referred back to what constitutes i l locu-
tionary success or acceptability in the narrower sense (understanding). These 
structural elements do not include necessarily "the [counterfactual] assumption 
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that agents always operate with a mutual ascribed interest in open and honest 
communication", for this very regulative presupposition is contradicted by a 
coercive exchange, where no demand of intersubjective recognisance underlies 
communication. Acceptability in the broader sense depends on the satisfaction 
of conditions different from mere sincerity from the part of the speaker; and 
the normative background from which regulative speech acts obtain their cor-
rectness and legitimacy is not to be identified with factual social institutions, 
but rather with formal, procedimental rules clearly violated in the case of a 
coercive imperative or threat. 
Here, R. Alexy's set of constitutive rules for practical discourse, arguably 
presupposed in any other form of communicative interaction, can be appelled 
to in order to realise that even in the case of "sincere threats", such rules result 
necessarily violated. In particular, the rational rules of justifiability express 
"demands for equality, universality, and lack of constraint by means of a gen-
eral rule of justification: "Every speaker must justify what he or she asserts upon 
request, unless he or she can provide grounds which justify avoiding giving a 
justification". This general statement is further developed through a set o f 
rules that correspond to the conditions proposed in TkH for the "ideal speech 
situation"; to the extend that they define "the most typical preconditions for 
discourse theory's concept of rationality", are termed by Alexy rules of reason. 
The main point here is that whoever justifies something pretends to accept the 
other person as equal partner in justification and "neither to exercise constraint 
nor to support constraint exercised by others"20. I t is diff icul t to see how, 
from an interaction based in a coercive imperative or a threat, the step to prac-
tical discourse could be taken. 
V 
The conclusion to be drawn is that the "normative background" invoqued for 
"legitimate threats" is not to be seen as inherent or constitutive of their i l locu-
tionary force as such. On the one hand, as argued above, Heath's examples 
should be seen more as warnings than as coercive threats. When a reconstruction 
is searched on how these speech acts count for speaker and hearer, the normative 
background that permits legitimizing the speech act includes a factual, extra-
linguistic social institution. 
On the other hand, either a coercive imperative or a threat in the proper 
sense could be considered successfully (instrumentally) performed, in the nar-
rower sense, whenever the general context conditions are of a kind that they 
impose an unequal distribution of forces, thus making the hypothesised action 
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stated by the speaker possible: ' i f those antecedent conditions are (not) satis-
fied / i f such-and-such state of things does not take place [through the hearer's 
action], then this state of things wi l l take place [through the agent's action]'. 
Here, the peculiar conditional structure of the speech act (" i f (not)..., then...), 
which approches it to constatives, is essential. The hearer's acceptance does not 
go back, nor does it depend on, a potential of reasons that would allow the 
speaker to justify his statement. Actions are counterfactually presented here 
objectualised (reified) and devoid of any moral dimension. Even i f the hearer 
beliefs the speaker sincere and acting "irrationally" from the instrumental, 
game-theoretical viewpoint, the "binding force" of a coercion does not come 
from constitutive rules inherent to the rational basis of speech -as in the case o f 
commitments that can legitimately be considered such-, but f rom extra-
linguistic circumstances and conditions. The grammars of the concept of coer-
cion, to speak along with Wittgenstein, does exclude an appel to normative 
presuppositions or legitimizing rules. 
A l l things considered, Heath's theoretical option seems to resort to a 
"weakening" of the notion of understanding-oriented action, to the effect that 
only acceptability conditions in the narrower sense -and the correlative notion 
of illocutionary success- are taken into account. Hence, the notion turns out to 
include actions typified in Habermas' original theory as instrumental, and in 
the last revision of the theory as non-communicative. 
Yet the underlying diff icul ty here could be deeper. The conceptual pair 
instrumental/communicative in TkH goes back to the Frankfurter Schule and 
the distinction between an objective and a subjective (or instrumental) rational-
ity, and to M . Weber's theory of rationality. Habermas seems to have been 
confident on the following: that strategic-instrumental action in this sense 
might be analysable in terms of rational choice theory, thus tacitly assuming 
that the theoretical notion of instrumental rationality embedded here would 
coincide with his own. Nevertheless, it could happen that they be, in fact, d i f -
ferent notions, only partially overlapping and to be necessarily situated within 
their respective conceptual frames. Nevertheless, the last revision of the theory 
allows for a conceptual distinction that restricts strategic rationality to perlo-
cutions and not to every non-communicative language uses. I t seems possible 
then a new effort to integrate game-theoretic analysis within this restricted 
domain. 
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